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Abstract
Aim: The aim of this study was to investigate the strategies used by the alcohol industry to
influence the reform of the Alcohol Act in Finland during the preparation phase between 2016
and 2017. The study answers the following research question: what strategies were used by
the alcohol industry to change the original purpose of the reform on alcohol in Finland?
Method: Primary data were collected through 16 expert interviews with experts who had
participated in the preparation of the alcohol reform in Finland, while secondary data were
collected from prior literature, journal articles and Google databases. Results: The results
identified three main political strategies used by the alcohol industry to influence the reform
of the law on alcohol in Finland during the preparation phase between 2016 and 2017:
“information”, under which the alcohol industry lobbied politicians in Parliament through
Members of Parliament of the National Coalition Party due to the close ties between the two;
“constituency building”, under which the alcohol industry formed alliances with interest
groups in the grocery-retail business in Finland, to advocate for liberalisation of the law, as
well as the use of social media – specifically Twitter – to lobby the public; and lastly, “policy
substitution” to promote self-regulation. Conclusions: The results suggest that the involve-
ment of the alcohol industry in political decision-making following Finland’s EU membership has
given the industry legitimacy and new opportunities to influence alcohol policy, while limiting
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policies to protect the public from alcohol-related harms. The results may be useful to alcohol
policy-makers.
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The globalisation of the production and market-
ing networks of alcohol has created a small
group of large alcohol corporations who are
able to influence policies by lobbying in global
forums such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the World Health Organization
(WHO) forums (Jernigan, 2012).
Previously, alcohol policy-making in Finland
has excluded the alcohol industry. Since Finland
joined the EU in 1995, the alcohol industry has
been invited to the working groups that prepare
alcohol legislation, and the alcohol industry has
become more international and more active in
lobbying to influence legislation with the aim of
increasing sales (Hellman, 2012; Lauronen,
Ma¨kela¨, Salminen, &Hiilamo, 2017). The inter-
national alcohol industry’s role has also become
more prominent in the sale, advertising and
policy-making of alcohol in Finland (Hellman,
2012). As a result, the international alcohol
industry has sought a more active role in the
Finnish market, which has weakened alcohol
regulation and the position of the state-owned
retail monopoly, Alko (Alavaikko & O¨sterberg,
2000; Hellman, 2012). These developments
have created new opportunities for the alcohol
industry to influence alcohol legislation in Fin-
land. The aim of this study was to analyse how
the industry has utilised these opportunities.
In Finland, alcohol use is a contributory
factor in nearly one quarter of deaths caused
by accidents, and for many societal problems
such as family conflicts, arrests, job instability
and frequent short periods of sick leave (O¨ster-
berg, 2007). According to Statistics Finland
(2015), 1,400 men and 400 women died from
alcohol-related diseases and alcohol poisoning
in Finland in 2014. The Alcohol Act in Finland
is intended to prevent the detrimental societal,
social and health effects caused by alcohol in
the country (O¨sterberg, 2007). Following
Estonia’s accession to membership of the EU
in May 2004, the possibility of importing prac-
tically unlimited amounts of cheap alcohol for
personal use was expected to become a major
draw for Finnish travellers visiting Estonia,
and was a key reason for which Finland felt
forced to lower its taxation of alcohol by an
average of 33% in March 2004 before Estonia
joined the EU (see Table 1).
The unprecedented alcohol tax cut in Fin-
land was followed by a sharp rise in consump-
tion and alcohol-related harms (Herttua,
Ma¨kela¨, & Martikainen, 2007; Ma¨kela¨ & O¨ster-
berg, 2007; Statistics Finland, 2015). Due to the
increase in alcohol-related harms in Finland,
researchers and non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) began to speak in favour of new
restrictions on alcohol sales and advertising to
improve public health and reduce the harms and
societal problems caused by alcohol (Karlsson,
2009; Montonen, 2008). This opened up the
discussion on ways of reforming the Alcohol
Act in Finland with the aim of reducing alcohol
harm. The preparations for a new Alcohol Act
in Finland began in 2011 with the specific aim
of reducing alcohol-related harm, but the gov-
ernment at the time did not manage to start
preparations for a new alcohol law, so it was
postponed to the next government (see Table 1).
The political work on the comprehensive Alco-
hol Act reform began in February 2016, when the
Minister of Social Affairs and Health, Juha
Rehula, presented his preliminary proposal to the
ministerial workinggroup onpromotion of health
and wellbeing (Tuominen, 2017a). The proposal
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Table 1. Chronology of events relating to the alcohol law reform in Finland (1995–2017).
Year Month Event
1995 January Finland’s Alcohol Act and 13 Decrees issued under the Act came into effect following
European Union (EU) membership.
2004 March Finland lowered its taxation of alcohol by an average of 33% before Estonia joined the EU
in May 2004, due to the ability of Finnish visitors to Estonia to import practically
unlimited amounts of cheap alcohol.
2011 May Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s National Coalition Party (NCP) government of June 2011
to June 2014 planned to fully reform the alcohol law but did not complete the process.
Twelve ministers of 19 came from the NCP and the Social Democratic Party (SDP),
while the Left Alliance, the Green League, the Swedish People’s Party (RKP) and the
Christian Democrats shared seven ministerial portfolios.
2014 June Prime Minister Alexander Stubb’s (NCP) government of June 2014 to May 2015. The
suspension was noted in the govenment plan so Stubbs government never had plans to
reform the law suspended the process. The NCP had six ministers in the Cabinet. The
Green League and the Swedish People’s Party had two ministers each and the Christian
Democrats had one.
2015 May Prime Minister Juha Sipila¨’s Centre Party (CP) government from May 2015 to the present
began with an agenda to reform the alcohol law. At the beginning of his tenure, there
were a total of 14 ministers in Sipila¨’s cabinet: six ministers from the CP and four each
from the NCP and the Finns Party (later Blue Alternative Party).
2016 February Political work on the comprehensive Alcohol Act reform began when the Minister of
Social Affairs and Health, Juha Rehula, presented his preliminary proposal to the
ministerial working group on promotion of health and wellbeing.
2016 May Parliamentary groups of the government parties discussed the preliminary proposal and
key policies regarding the reform were outlined.
2016 November The ministerial working group on promotion of health and wellbeing discussed the draft
government proposal on the Alcohol Act before the proposal was circulated for
comment to all the relevant stakeholders.
2017 January End of comments on the preliminary proposal from all the relevant stakeholders.
2017 March A summary of comments on the comprehensive reform of the Alcohol Act was
completed.
2017 April Preparation of the new Alcohol Act.
2017 June Breakthrough in the alcohol law reform by which the newly reconstituted government
agreed to ease restrictions on the sale of alcohol in Finland. It had taken more than two
years for MPs to reach agreement on the proposed changes to the Alcohol Act. The
most divisive part of the debate had centred on a plan to allow grocery shops to sell
drinks with up to 5.5% alcohol content. MPs from the CP opposed the sale of such
beverages in grocery shops. However, other members of the governing coalition largely
backed the measure (Vaalisto, 2017).
2017 September The government proposal on a new Alcohol Act was submitted to Parliament by the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health for deliberation by MPs.
2017 October MPs were split fifty-fifty on whether or not a new alcohol law should be passed that would
raise the maximum allowed alcohol content of beverages sold in grocery shops to 5.5%,
and extend the opening hours of the Finnish alcohol monopoly Alko, among other
things.
2017 December The new Alcohol Act was adopted by Parliament.
2017 December The President of the Republic approved the new Alcohol Act.
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was finalised in theMinistry of SocialAffairs and
Health (MSAH) andwas submitted to Parliament
in September 2017. The most liberal change was
to increase the alcoholic content permissible for
drinks for sale in grocery stores from 4.7% to
5.5% (Tuominen, 2017b), which meant that the
state-owned retailmonopoly,Alko,would lose its
monopoly on selling drinks of strength 4.7–5.5%
(Tuominen, 2017c).
Comparing the proposed alcohol law sub-
mitted to Parliament in September 2017with the
original intention of the reform, which was
meant to restrict sales (Tuominen, 2017a), it is
obvious that the focus was shifted from restrict-
ing sales in order to prevent the negative effects
of alcohol in Finland, to liberalisation of the
alcohol law. Since the alcohol industry was
involved in policy-making in Finland (Ala-
vaikko & O¨sterberg, 2000), the aim of this study
was to investigate the strategies used by the alco-
hol industry to influence the reform of the law on
alcohol in Finland. This study concentrates on
the alcohol industry though there are other actors
with interests, for example public health groups.
The focus of this study is on the ways in which
the alcohol industry intervened to lobby in the
process of policy-making and in shaping the
final version of the proposal to match the indus-
try’s preferences. The study utilised primary
data from interviews and secondary data from
prior literature, journal articles, and Google
databases. The study answers the following
research question: what strategies were used
by the alcohol industry to change the original
purpose of the reform on alcohol in Finland?
Method
The theoretical framework of this study is that
the terms of alcohol debate can be understood
through an analysis of the interest groups with
the greatest stakes and influence over the role of
the product. More than anything else alcohol
debate is an interplay between two opposing
groups, namely the alcohol industry, which
seeks to exploit alcohol markets, and public
health activists. Neither of the groups is
disinterested, acting only on the basis of, for
example, politically neutral science. While
acknowledging the role of health activists, this
study focuses on the role of the alcohol indus-
try. We utilise the neo-pluralistic perspective on
research on organised interests, which empha-
sises the importance of contingency and context
when studying how different types of interest
groups behave and underlines interest groups
(Lowery & Gray, 2004).
We adopted a case study design, acknowl-
edging that the boundaries between alcohol
industry lobbying and real-life contexts are not
evident, and where multiple sources of evi-
dence are required (Yin, 1984). The data col-
lected for this study were divided into primary
and secondary data. Primary data were col-
lected through interviews with experts who had
participated in the preparation of the alcohol
reform between 2016 and 2017, namely politi-
cians, researchers, a civil servant, representa-
tives from the alcohol industry interest
groups, and health groups active in alcohol
policy-making (see Table 2). A total of 16 inter-
views were conducted with informants who had
first-hand knowledge of the process. The inter-
views were conducted face to face (Carter,
2016) with each interviewee individually. The
interviewees were selected through purposive
sampling (Emmel, 2013). All the interviewees
were selected on the grounds that as experts,
they had first-hand knowledge of the alcohol
industry’s influence on the overall reform of the
law on alcohol in Finland. The researchers were
selected for interviews due to their expertise
and track records in alcohol policy research. All
the politician interviewees were Members of
Parliament (MPs) from the three biggest
political parties represented in the Finnish Par-
liament, namely the Centre Party (CP), the
National Coalition Party (NCP) and the Social
Democratic Party (SDP). Only MPs from these
political parties were interviewed because MPs
from the other political parties either declined
the invitation to be interviewed or did not
respond.
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The researcher interviewees were from the
Finnish National Institute for Health and Wel-
fare, and from the University of Helsinki, Fin-
land. The lone civil servant interviewee was
from the Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and
Health. Meanwhile, the interviewees represent-
ing the alcohol industry interest groupswere from
the Finnish Food and Drink Industries Federa-
tion, the Finnish Grocery Trade Association and
the FinnishHospitalityAssociation.The intervie-
wees from health groups were from the Finnish
Association for Mental Health and the Finnish
Association for Substance Abuse Prevention.
The interviews were conducted at the work pre-
mises of the interviewees and were recorded on a
disc recorder for transcription and subsequent
analysis. All the interviewees were contacted via
email by the researcher requesting an interview.
A date, place and time for the interview was
agreed between the two parties.Most of the inter-
view questions were open-ended for detailed ela-
boration of the responses. The interviews were
conducted from April 2017 to July 2017. The
transcribed interview data consisted of 56 pages.
Meanwhile, secondary data were collected for
this study from prior literature, journal articles,
news items and Google databases.
In the context of case study design, the data
for this study were analysed qualitatively using
content analysis. We approached the interview
data with a constructivist/interpretative per-
spective where we assumed that the informants,
despite not being neutral actors, conveyed rel-
evant and truthful information concerning the
reform. Content analysis was used to classify or
code the data into a number of categories
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Vaismoradi, Turu-
nen, & Bondas, 2013). In the framework of
analysis, alcohol industry political activity was
divided into strategies and individual “tactics”
(the methods by which a corporation attempts
to exert influence) and “frames” containing
individual “arguments” (the reasons given by
a corporation as to why they oppose one idea
or support another). The data were coded under
the five categories put forward by Savell,
Fooks, and Gilmore (2016) of political strate-
gies used by the alcohol industry to lobby
Table 2. Distribution of influence by experts in the overall reform of the law on alcohol in Finland between
2016 and 2017.
Level of governance Finland EU
Parliamentary groups Finnish Parliament and exchange across political parties:
– Centre Party (CP)
– National Coalition Party (NCP)
– Social Democratic Party (SDP)
– Finns Party (later Blue Alternative Party)
European Parliament /
European
Commission
Trade associations
and interest groups
– Finnish Federation of the Brewing and Soft Drinks
Industry (Panimoliitto)
– Finnish Grocery Trade Association
– Finnish Food and Drink Industries’ Federation
– Finnish Hospitality Association
Brewers of Europe
Lobby groups – Finnish Federation of the Brewing and Soft Drinks
Industry (Panimoliitto) plus interest groups
n/a
Civil society
associations
– Finnish Association for Substance Abuse Prevention
– Finnish Association for Mental Health
European Alcohol
Policy Alliance
(Eurocare)
National agencies – National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and
Health
Researchers – National Institute for Health and Welfare
– University of Helsinki
n/a
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against marketing restrictions, namely: (1)
“information” (providing or misrepresenting
evidence); (2) “constituency building” (forming
alliances with other sectors, organisations, or
the public to give the impression of greater sup-
port for the industry’s position); (3) “policy
substitution, development and implementation”
(proposing, supporting or helping to implement
alternative policies); (4) “legal” (using the legal
system) and “financial incentive or disin-
centive” (offering direct or indirect monetary
incentives or threatening financial withdrawal);
and (5) regulatory redundancy (industry adheres
to self-regulation). This framework of codifica-
tion was developed in an earlier systematic
review of tobacco industry political activity by
Savell, Gilmore, and Fooks (2014) on alcohol
industry political activity, based partly on the
article by Hillman and Hitt (1999) on corporate
political strategy formulation. The coding cate-
gories (strategies and tactics) were amended and
developed into the framework for the data anal-
ysis of this study. In this study “strategies” refers
to the direction and scope of the alcohol indus-
try’s long-term goals (to increase sales and prof-
its), while “tactics” refers to the means by which
a strategy is carried out.
The informants in this study are anonymous.
In order to protect the identity of the informants
while reporting our results, we will not disclose
which categories a particular informant belongs
to for reasons of research ethics.
Results
Our results identified three main political stra-
tegies used by the alcohol industry federation
(in Finnish: Panimoliitto), to change the origi-
nal purpose of the reform on alcohol in Finland,
based on the five categories of Savell et al.
(2016); political strategies used by the alcohol
industry to lobby against marketing restrictions
as follows: “information”, under which the
alcohol industry directly lobbied politicians in
Parliament through MPs of the NCP, due to the
close ties between the two; “constituency
building”, under which the alcohol industry
formed alliances with interest groups in the gro-
cery–retail business in Finland to advocate for
liberalisation of the law and used social media,
specifically Twitter, to lobby the public; and
lastly, “policy substitution” to promote self-
regulation (see Table 3). The breakdown of the
analysis is given below.
Table 3. Strategies and tactics used by the alcohol industry to change the original purpose of the reform.
Strategy Tactics
Information – Direct lobbying of politicians in Parliament through members of the
NCP working groups (Parliament, Ministry of Health)
– Revolving door
– Commissioned or disseminated research - shaping the evidence
base
– Economic benefits for the government (e.g., more job creation in
the service sector and tax revenue)
Constituency building – Forming alliances with interest groups in the grocery chain and with
sports federations
– Media advocacy (social media including Twitter, press releases,
public information campaigns, participation on public debates on
TV)
– International partners (The Brewers of Europe)
Policy substitution, development
and implementation
– Promoting alternative policies
– Promoting self-regulation
Legal n/a
Regulatory redundancy n/a
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Information
Our results from the interview data indicate that
a variety of information tactics were used by the
alcohol industry federation (Panimoliitto) to
change the original purpose of the reform from
restrictions to liberalisation. Respondents were
unanimous in stating that Panimoliitto had
direct contact with politicians in Parliament to
change the original purpose of the reform
through MPs of the NCP, due to the close ties
between Panimoliitto and the NCP. Respon-
dents said the direct contact involved appoint-
ments and working-group meetings in
Parliament. Respondents also said that among
the political parties in the Parliament, the NCP
was in favour of liberalising the entire alcohol
law, while the CP and the SDP were not. The
Finns Party (later Blue Alternative Party) was
also in favour of liberalising the law. According
to some respondents, through the direct contact
that Panimoliitto had with politicians in Parlia-
ment, they were able to influence the process of
policy-making to change the original purpose
of the reform as several of the political parties
also had the same interest to liberalise the alco-
hol law which they thought had too many
restrictions and needed to be modernised. In
this regard, the change in the original purpose
of the reform was also influenced by coinciding
interests between Panimoliitto and some polit-
ical parties in Parliament.
Respondents indicated that in Finland, there
is a long tradition of the chief executive officer
(CEO) of Panimoliitto coming from the NCP.
Respondents said due to the close ties between
the NCP and Panimoliitto, the three last CEOs
of Panimoliitto have been employees of the
NCP. A respondent said for example that
“people who lobby for Panimoliitto in Finland
know each other because some of the MPs of
the NCP have worked with Panimoliitto and
vice-versa”. This is often referred to as the
“revolving door”, which is when government
officials leave office to become lobbyists and
vice versa (Miller & Harkins, 2013; Tim &
Herschel, 2012). Currently, there is no
legislation in Finland to prevent the “revolving
door” practice, though regulating it has been
discussed (Blom, 2018; Lauronen et al., 2017).
Respondents unanimously said Panimoliitto
also had strong connections with MPs of some
other political parties in Parliament who were in
favour of liberalising the alcohol law in Fin-
land, such as the Finns Party (later Blue Alter-
native Party) (Vaalisto, 2017). The alcohol
industry’s involvement has been key to the for-
mation of partnerships with politicians on
alcohol-policy issues since Finland joined the
EU in 1995 and the alcohol industry became
involved in policy-making through invitations
to the working groups that prepare alcohol leg-
islation in Finland at the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Health and in Parliament (Hellman,
2012; Lauronen et al., 2017). Governments
have been forced to take the alcohol industry’s
perspectives into account because, besides the
public health interest, economic interest is also
politically important (Adams, Buetow, &
Rossen, 2010; Miller, De Groot, McKenzie, &
Droste, 2011).
Respondents also reported that Panimoliitto
had used commissioned or disseminated
research reports to change the original purpose
of the reform of alcohol legislation in Finland.
These research reports were sometimes used by
Panimoliitto and support groups to discredit
public health research results, claiming that
public health authorities had an agenda to main-
tain the state-owned alcohol monopoly system,
Alko, in Finland. For instance, the results indi-
cate that the alcohol industry interest groups,
such as the Finnish Food and Drink Industries
Federation, Finnish Grocery Trade Association
and the Finnish Hospitality Association, used
commissioned research results and citations to
influence public opinion by saying, for exam-
ple, that it was time for Finland to adopt Eur-
opean drinking culture and that Finland does
not need too many regulations because only
10% of people drink too much and in the wrong
way. Panimoliitto often argued that the people
who drink too much are the problem and that
they need to be put into rehabilitation so that
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they can come out and drink responsibly. By so
doing, the interest groups and the alcohol indus-
try populate the evidence base with non-peer-
reviewed research which, among other things,
tends to highlight the health benefits of alcohol
while omitting evidence of its negative health
and social effects (Hiilamo, 2003; Savell et al.,
2016). Respondents said that Panimoliitto
sometimes used academics to speak for their
interests directly or indirectly whenever it
found research results counterproductive to its
business interests. Commissioned or dissemi-
nated research reports have also been used by
the tobacco industry in Finland and other coun-
tries. For example, similar studies have been
carried out on the tobacco industry by Hiilamo
(2003) and Savell et al. (2016).
One other tactic that respondents said Pani-
moliitto used was to argue that liberalising the
law would create more jobs and generate more
tax revenue for the government. Panimoliitto
argued that liberalising the alcohol law in
Finland would discourage Finns from buying
alcohol from other countries such as Estonia.
Respondents said, for example, that the state-
owned retail monopoly, Alko, sells eight mil-
lion litres of strong beer per year in Finland, but
consumers bring 36 million litres into Finland
from abroad. Many Finns buy alcohol from
abroad because of the great difference between
domestic prices of alcohol and those available
on the cruise ships to Estonia and between Hel-
sinki and Stockholm. Panimoliitto argued that
because Finland had by far the heaviest taxes on
alcohol in the EU, and Finland’s beer tax was
many times that of Estonia’s, that every
increase in Finnish alcohol taxation fuelled the
volume of alcohol imported via cross-border
trade into Finland (Panimoliitto, 2017).
Respondents said that Panimoliitto had been
lobbying for many years to liberalise the alco-
hol law in Finland, to make it easier for grocery
shops to sell stronger alcoholic drinks. The
change was not sudden because discussions to
change the law had been going on since 2011,
during the government of Prime Minister Jyrki
Katainen. The lobbying by the alcohol industry
has always been for their economic interests
(Alavaikko & O¨sterberg, 2000).
Constituency building
Constituency building has often been linked to
indirect lobbying by the alcohol industry
(Savell et al., 2016). Our results indicate that
Panimoliitto used constituency building as a
strategy by forming alliances with interest
groups in the grocery–retail business in Fin-
land. Through these alliances, they were able
to argue against public-health measures and to
advocate for liberalisation of the law. Alliances
influence policies by making public opinion
appear to be on the lobbyists’ side (Savell
et al., 2016). In addition to alliances with inter-
est groups in the grocery–retail business in Fin-
land, the alcohol industry has alliances with
sports federations such as the Finnish Ice
Hockey Federation, as sports sponsorship by
the alcohol industry is a venerable tradition in
Western countries (Collins & Vamplew, 2002).
The cooperation between the Finnish Ice
Hockey Federation and the alcohol industry
was beneficial for both parties through adver-
tising, as sports and business intersect in brew-
ing industry sponsorship. At the EU level, the
EU Football Federation Association of Eur-
opean Professional Football Leagues (EPFL)
and the European Sponsorship Association
(ESA) are supported by the alcohol industry
with commercial interests as their target.
Respondents unanimously said Panimoliitto
used social media, specifically Twitter, to lobby
the public and give the impression of greater
support for the industry’s position. Panimoliitto
had 4034 followers and 17,500 tweets as of 27
April 2018; they created their account in
December 2010. Respondents said Panimoliitto
has a number of support groups with common
interests on Twitter who often retweet their
tweets, and who are in favour of abolishing the
Finnish alcohol monopoly because, to them,
this represents the freedom for Finns to drink
alcohol as much as they want. The followers see
restrictions as old-fashioned and paternalistic.
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Respondents said Panimoliitto tweets regu-
larly to lobby the public by saying drinking is
normal and that it is a minority of the Finnish
populationwho abuse alcohol because they have
an addiction problem. For that reason, themajor-
ity should not be restricted from drinking. Pani-
moliitto also advocates that Finns should be free
to decide themselves when they want to buy
alcohol, where and howmuch alcohol they want
to buy as part of being “Europeans” (cf. Ugland,
2002). Panimoliitto often argue that Finland
should become like the rest of “Europe” in its
drinking habits because the alcohol industry in
Finland has been pan-European since Finland
became a member of the EU. The pan-
European association called Brewers of Europe
supports national federations in EU member
countries and they influence alcohol policy-
making in EU member countries through the
national federations (Munro, 2004).
In order to give the public the impression of
greater support for the industry’s position, Pani-
moliitto advocates that Finns should be free to
buy alcohol in grocery shops and that restric-
tions should be abolished because Finland is not
a nanny state in which the state should control
the drinking habit of Finns. They argue that
individuals should consume alcohol responsi-
bly. The alcohol industry frequently attempts
to shift the blame for alcohol misuse to the
consumer and away from their products and
marketing strategies (Jernigan, 2012). The
focus on a small number of alcohol misusers
provides the industry with a frame that has the
potential to invalidate the focus on health pol-
icy. A respondent said the alcohol industry
often argues that since the damage done by
alcohol is caused by a small group of deviants,
we should deal with them using education and
treatment, and not through regulations that pun-
ish the “innocent majority”.
Respondents said the alcohol industry also
lobbied through the media using press releases
and public information campaigns on Face-
book, and by participating in public debates
on TV to shape the news and public agenda.
For example, the alcohol industry creates
narratives such as, if it becomes easy for people
to get 5.5% alcohol from grocery shops, the
people who start drinking more will be the 5–
15% who are already heavy drinkers. To them,
this will not affect the rest of the population.
This kind of narrative, according to the respon-
dents, can undermine the social and health facts
about the harms caused by alcohol in Finland.
The harms caused by alcohol in Finland include
deaths from alcohol-related diseases and alco-
hol poisoning (Statistics Finland, 2015).
Policy substitution
Policy substitution is used by the alcohol indus-
try to prevent the implementation of formal
marketing regulations, and is a strategy that has
been documented globally (Giesbrecht, 2000;
Hope, 2006; Jernigan, 2012). Respondents said
that Panimoliitto often promotes alternative
policies by saying that 90% of Finns must not
be restricted from drinking alcohol because of
the 10%who drink too much. They propose that
the law should be liberalised to give Finns the
freedom to drink as much alcohol as they want.
This argument is used to promote self-regula-
tory policies. Panimoliitto also proposes that
people should be educated to drink responsibly
through education programmes.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to identify the stra-
tegies used by the alcohol industry to influence
the overall reform of the law on alcohol in Fin-
land during the preparation phase between 2016
and 2017. The results indicate that the main
strategies used by the Finnish Federation of the
Brewing and Soft Drinks Industry (Panimo-
liitto) to change the original purpose of the
reform from restricting sales in order to prevent
the negative effects of alcohol in Finland, to liber-
alisation of the alcohol law were: “information”,
“constituency building”, and lastly, “policy sub-
stitution”. The results demonstrate that Panimo-
liitto has lobbying power and clearly influences
policy-making. The results also indicate that
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Panimoliitto argues against marketing regulation
by promoting self-regulation, and by focusing on
individual responsibility. Arguments relating to
industry responsibility are often reinforced
through corporate social responsibility activities.
Thus, the alcohol industry engages in corporate
political activities to create a favourable regulatory
environment in which to operate by using strate-
gies such as lobbying, shaping the evidence base
and promoting self-regulatory policies (Jernigan,
2012). Our research shows that in public debate,
the alcohol industry tries to convey its arguments
through citing evidence-based research.
In line with Savell et al. (2016), gaining
access to political decision-makers by provid-
ing information is an important alcohol industry
strategy to influence policy. The use of social
media, specifically Twitter, emerged in this
study as a new strategy to influence policy
through shaping the evidentiary content of pol-
icy debates (McGarity &Wagner, 2012). Social
media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter,
Snapchat and Instagram are used in the devel-
opment of alcohol marketing (Atkinson, Ross-
Houle, Begley, & Sumnall, 2016). Globally, the
alcohol industry’s involvement in policy-
making is not new, and there has been an
increase in the industry’s efforts to lobby in
order to influence policies and to be seen as a
key partner in alcohol policy-making (Yoon &
Lam, 2013). A growing body of literature
points to the role of vested interests as a barrier
to the implementation of public health policies
aiming to reduce alcohol-related harm and to
the ability of governments to pursue public
interest policies such as alcohol regulation.
Corporate political activity by the alcohol
industry is commonly used to influence policy
and regulation in ways favourable to the indus-
try, since the industry is heavily involved in
planning of public health policy (Martino,
Miller, Coomber, Hancock, & Kypri, 2017).
Research suggests that such partnerships
advance the interests of the industry rather than
public health because the industry merely pro-
motes policies that fail to reduce alcohol sales.
Five frames have been identified in which the
alcohol industry claimed that increased regula-
tion: (1) is unnecessary, (2) is not backed up by
sufficient evidence, (3) will lead to unintended
negative consequences, and (4) faces legal bar-
riers to implementation, underpinned by the
view that (5) the industry consists of socially
responsible companies working toward reduc-
ing harmful drinking (Martino et al., 2017).
In Finland, like in other Nordic countries
Iceland, Sweden and Norway, with the excep-
tional role of the state in the regulation of alco-
hol consumption, alcohol policy is often
presented as unique because of its strong
emphasis on public-health protection, and the
exceptional role of the state in the regulation
of alcohol consumption (Alavaikko, 2002).
Our results conflict with this image. The
case of passing a new alcohol law in Finland
demonstrates that the alcohol industry has lob-
bying power and clearly influences policy-
making. Panimoliitto as an economic actor was
able to influence the process of policy-making
to change the original purpose of the reform as
the NCP and The Blue Alternative Party (for-
mer Finns Party), had ideological convictions to
liberalise the alcohol law. Similarly, an earlier
study in Finland by Lauronen et al. (2017),
found that the alcohol industry successfully
used information and constituency building to
oppose bans on image advertising. These
results add to the evidence of alcohol industry
corporate political activities designed to shape
policy (McGarity & Wagner, 2012).
We conclude that the involvement of the
alcohol industry in policy-making in Finland,
may represent a key barrier to the development
of effective alcohol policies. The industry’s
political activity is varied and the industry’s
opposition to marketing regulation centres on
claims that the industry is responsible and that
self-regulation is effective.
Strengths and limitations
The main strength of this study is that it pro-
vides a broad overview of the alcohol industry’s
tactics and arguments. Its attempt to categorise
Sama and Hiilamo 565
the industry’s strategies/tactics and arguments
suggests that the findings may be applicable
across different contexts, such as in the tobacco
industry. This study has a number of limitations:
first, we did not have access to internal alcohol-
industry documents which may have shed light
on other strategies identified by Savell et al.
(2016), including targeting political decision-
makers indirectly through constituent support.
Second, we were not able to assess the effective-
ness of lobbying strategies, as the political pro-
cess to pass the new law was postponed and the
final decision was taken after we had collected
our interview data. Third, the identification of
tactics and arguments, and the contexts in which
they are used, is dependent upon the interview
and secondary data. Fourth, despite triangulat-
ing our interview data with document data and
news, we were not able to check the validity of
all the factual statements of our informants.
Implications for policy, practice and
research
This study has identified strategies and tactics
as well as arguments used by the alcohol indus-
try between 2016 and 2017 to change the orig-
inal purpose of the alcohol law reform in
Finland from restrictions on alcohol marketing
to liberalisation of the law. Therefore, this study
may be useful to policy-makers who wish to
understand how the alcohol industry may try
to influence the process of policy-making.
Policy-makers may use the results of this study
to prepare effective counter-strategies against
the alcohol industry. This study has also further
developed the framework for classifying corpo-
rate political activity outlined in Savell et al.
(2016) and shown the policy and scholarly
value of applying them to other industries, such
as the tobacco industry.
Future research could apply these frame-
works to other industries such as the tobacco
industry or to other policy areas. Future
research could also assess the effectiveness of
the lobbying strategies used by the alcohol
industry to influence policy.
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